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The Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative has gained much popularity since its launch at the World 
Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference in 2005, and there are ongoing discussions on its 
effectiveness and potential to improve the integration of developing countries into the world 
economy. This paper contributes to the debate by analyzing AfT in a political economy 
context. We find that the delivery of AfT is a precondition for trade reform in developing 
countries, as well as for trade liberalization and trade-enhancing rule-making in regional and 
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1  Introduction 
Notwithstanding the progress in trade liberalization  –  multilaterally, bilaterally and 
unilaterally  –  and  economic reform in many developing countries, today it is widely 
acknowledged that trade issues have  to be seen in the broader context of sustained 
development. Against this background, Aid for Trade (AfT) has emerged as a major WTO 
initiative at the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005 
alongside the Doha Development Agenda.1  AfT  entails external assistance to developing 
countries for them to benefit from international trade and make trade liberalization possible, 
based on the assumption that “open trade is an important engine for development” (WTO 
2010a). An argument in favor of AfT can indeed be made at each stage of trade liberalization. 
This is mainly because existing economic incentives appear to be insufficient to sustain the 
liberalization process, particularly now in the wake of the global economic and financial 
crisis. During the crisis many countries have resorted to some form of trade restricting and 
distorting measures which they have been reluctant to remove afterwards. Examples include 
border barriers to trade, such as import tariffs, export taxes and anti-dumping duties, as well 
as behind-the-border policies granting subsidies to domestic firms and according them a 
preferential status in government procurement.2
Aid for Trade can contribute to the effective roll back of trade interventionism. It can also 
help to push forward the process of trade liberalization and rule-making in trade policy. This 
holds for domestic trade reforms as well as for trade policy concerning the multilateral level. 
Last but not least, AfT can be a major vehicle for developing countries to capitalize on trade 
liberalization and trade reforms, and to confront the internal and external adjustment pressures 
arising in the process.  
 
Current research on Aid for Trade (AfT) concentrates on identifying the most binding 
economic constraints on trade expansion and diversification in developing countries and on 
assessing the effectiveness of AfT projects to overcome such constraints and thus enhance 
economic progress, development and welfare.3
                                                 
1 As noted by Hoekman and Wilson (2010), the impulse to the AfT project has come from the 2005 G8 meeting 
in Gleneagles, Scotland, while the WTO Hong Kong conference created the WTO Aid for Trade Task Force to 
provide recommendations to the WTO Director-General on how to best “operationalize” AfT. 
 The present study builds on these writings. It 
lays the emphasis on the political economy of AfT starting from the observation that “vested” 
interests frequently oppose the liberalization of trade with developing countries which holds 
both for imports into these countries and for their exports. The study therefore looks at the 
2 For an overview of developments in trade policy during the crisis and in the immediate post-crisis (covering 
developments from 1 November 2009 to mid-May 2010,) see WTO (2009a) and WTO (2010b), respectively. 
3 On the first aspect (binding constraints), see for instance Hallaert and Munro (2009). The second aspect 
(effectiveness) is dealt with in Helble et al. (2009) amongst others. For an overview of evidence on AfT 
effectiveness, see Hoekman and Wilson (2010). Busse et al. (2010) study the effectiveness of Aid for Trade in 
reducing trade costs.    3 
possibilities of AfT to support internal (“own”) and external (“foreign”) trade liberalization 
and to improve international trading rules to the benefit of developing countries. Accordingly, 
it is also an exercise in linking the AfT initiative to the wider trade and development agenda 
and in particular to the development-openness debate. 
The analysis proceeds in three stages: 
1.  It starts with a stock-taking of the AfT initiative and its theoretical background. 
2.  This is followed by a discussion of the interests and strategies of the main stakeholders in 
AfT. 
3.  Finally, the potential of AfT to promote trade liberalization and facilitate trade on the 




2  Aid for Trade - Rationale, theory, design 
2.1  The domestic versus international approach to economic development 
The AfT initiative seeks to build a bridge between development and trade policy. In essence, 
AfT is foreign (financial and technical) assistance to developing countries in the negotiation, 
design, implementation and assessment  of trade and complementary policies.  Beyond 
conventional trade policy tools, these policies typically comprise measures, regulations and 
institution-building with a variety of purposes: 
•  Infrastructure and customs modernization to reduce transaction costs (and corruption) and 
further trade facilitation. 
•  Overhaul of the legal framework to secure property rights, prompt enforcement of 
contracts and well-functioning bureaucracies. 
•  Industrial policies and technological support programs to create internationally 
competitive production structures in areas with high value-added and a high degree of 
integration through cross-border supply chains. 
•  Tax reforms to make up for the loss of tariff revenues from trade liberalization. 
•  Strengthening of social safety nets to compensate those who lose their jobs due to import 
growth. 
•  Labor market reforms to promote inter- and intra-sector labor mobility. 
•  Education and training programs to provide qualified personnel for export-oriented 
companies and investors.   4 
•  Financial market reforms to provide firms, in particular small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, with adequate funds for investment. 
•  Appropriate macroeconomic and exchange rate policies to improve international 
competitiveness.  
The ultimate objective of AfT therefore is to mobilize resources for the build-up of trade-
related policy capacities  to increase exports and imports in the interest of economic 
development and poverty reduction. It is sought to create a “package of assets” or a “bundle 
of institutional arrangements” (Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier 2007) for developing countries 
to better integrate themselves into international trade and the international trading system. In 
fact, the bundling together of existing structures of trade-related aid activities is what makes 
AfT a novel approach to economic and social development. 
The role of trade and trade policy in economic development is contentious in theory as well as 
on empirical grounds.4  The controversy about trade and growth  essentially reflects the 
“international” versus the “domestic” approach to economic development.5
Besides the non-trade factors, the structure of trade itself is important for economic and social 
development via trade. This holds for the import and export sides of trade. With regard to the 
import structure, those countries concentrating on the import of goods with a relatively high 
research and development (R&D) content appear to achieve higher income growth rates than 
other countries. Taking  the example of Indonesia,  Amiti  and  Koning  (2007)  find  in this 
context that a reduction by 10 percentage points of tariffs on imported (presumably R&D 
intensive) inputs raises the productivity of local firms using  the inputs  by 11  percent.  A 
similar  link  exists  between a country’s import liberalization and its export performance. 
Through the reduction of prices for imported inputs, liberalization tends to shift the incentive 
 According to the 
international approach, opening the domestic economy to foreign trade, investment and 
competition is a prerequisite for sustained income growth in developing countries and indeed 
its prime determinant. However, it is also acknowledged that complementary policies to trade 
liberalization,  such  as indicated  above,  are necessary for trade  to grow dynamically  and 
actually enhance economic and social development. Indeed, empirical analysis has identified 
a number of non-trade  preconditions  for a successful trade-growth nexus. Among these 
factors are good governance and high-quality institutions (Borrmann et al. 2006, Freund and 
Bolaky 2008) as well as a high human capital depth, well-developed financial markets, a good 
public infrastructure and a sufficient measure of labor market flexibility (Chang et al. 2009, 
Kneller et al. 2008, Winters 2004).  
                                                 
4 For empirical studies that find that trade effectively drives growth and development, see Sachs and Warner 
(1995), Edwards (1998), Greenaway et al. (2002) and Wacziarg and Welch (2008). Other studies find the 
contrary (Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000, Vamvakidis 2002). 
5 For the “international approach” see, for instance, Krueger (2008) and Sachs (2008), while Rodrik (2008) and 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2008), amongst others, advocate the “domestic approach”.   5 
structure towards greater production for exports. Non-liberalization, on the other hand, would 
encourage resource flows into protected and inefficient import-competing sectors with little 
incentive to innovate. Empirical evidence on sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, nevertheless 
reveals a rather limited export response to the wide-ranging import liberalization that has 
taken place in this region since the mid-1990s. This is mostly the result of a weak supply 
capacity and poor trading infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa and thus poses a challenge to 
AfT.6
In contrast to the international approach, the domestically-centered  view of  development 
leaves little room for direct measures in support of trade, as trade promotion is not among its 
priorities. Rather, the emphasis is on domestic governance and institution-building. Urgent 
development priorities include  education, public health, industrial capacity  and social 
cohesion while domestic development is opposed to global integration. Global integration is a 
possible outcome of domestic development strategies but not perceived to be a driving force 
of economic and social progress. As Rodrik (2008) puts it, “growth begins at home”. A key 
notion in this context is “policy space” (Rodrik 2007) which also involves the freedom to 
adopt restrictive trade strategies and a preference for domestic over foreign investors. 
 Finally, concerning the export structure, UNCTAD (2002) points to a vicious nexus 
particularly in least-developed countries (LDCs) between reliance on (non-fuel) commodity 
exports and extreme poverty: the share of people living on less than one dollar per day is 
found to increase significantly with a declining degree of export variety. On the contrary, 
broadening the export base and enriching it with higher-value products through the 
development of dynamic comparative advantages could help to reduce poverty and further 
economic development.  
AfT is certainly more in line with the international view than with the domestic development 
perspective. The international approach to trade and development pertains to the whole AfT 
agenda. It has a direct bearing on specific AfT activities while stressing the public-good 
nature of AfT.  Accordingly,  AfT  can  prevent “under-investment” in trade reforms  which 
might occur if the reforming country would have to share the benefits of trade reforms with its 
trading partners.  The international approach  also  advocates  “strategic liberalization,” 
emphasizing the time pattern of trade policy and its coordination with complementary policies 
(“sequencing”). This especially applies to institutional development, i.e. the establishment of 
market-creating, market-regulating, market-stabilizing and market-legitimizing institutions, 
which takes time. Trade liberalization  in  developing countries would therefore  have to 
proceed in lockstep with advances in institution-building. 
 
                                                 
6 For greater detail, see UNCTAD (2008).   6 
2.2  Core areas and quantitative significance of Aid for Trade 
The core areas of AfT are trade policy, trade development and adjustment to trade. This 
“triad” is a condensation of the AfT categories proposed by the WTO Task Force on Aid for 
Trade (WTO 2006), as shown in the box below (Figure 1). In particular, we subsume the Task 
Force’s categories 3 (“trade-related infrastructure”) and 4 (“building productive capacity”) 
under “trade development”. 
 
Figure 1. Categories of Aid for Trade Proposed by WTO Task Force 
 
Source: WTO (2006). 
 
Between 2002 and 2008, total AfT flows amounted on annual average to 19.3 billion US$ 
(disbursements in constant 2008 prices), a share of around one third of Total Sector Allocable 
ODA.  Within  AfT, the bulk of disbursements relates to Economic Infrastructure such as 
transport and storage, communications and energy. In second place are Productive Capacity 
Building  and Trade Development. The category of Trade  Policies  and  Regulations, by 
contrast, represents a minor proportion of AfT (Figure 2). It amounts to 673 million US$ on 
average, which is 3.5 percent of AfT. In terms of the recipient country’s stage of development 
according to income classes (gross national income (GNI) per capita), low income countries 
receive the bulk of AfT, as shown in Figure 3 for the average country by income groups. 
Within the group of low income countries, LDCs receive less AfT than other low income 
countries which might be explained by potential absorption capacity constraints and the fact 
that our calculations do not take account of the population size. Another possible reason could 
be that the LDCs’ most urgent needs are not so much trade-related, but rather relate to 
nutrition and social programmes (Agboghoroma et al. 2009).  
1.  Trade Policy and Regulations. This includes training of trade officials, 
analysis of proposals and positions and their impact on national stakeholders, 
technical and institutional support to facilitate the implementation of trade 
agreements and the compliance with rules and standards. 
2.  Trade Development, e.g. investment and trade promotion, support in different 
trade sectors and trade finance, market analysis and development. 
3.  Trade-related Infrastructure, including physical infrastructure to connect 
domestic and foreign markets. 
4.  Building Productive Capacity, meaning investments in industries and specific 
sectors so that countries are able to diversify production and exports. 
5.  Trade-related Adjustment. This category comprises complementary measures 
absorbing some of the costs linked to tariff reductions or declining terms of 
trade to make developing countries benefit from trade liberalization. 
6.  Other Trade-related Needs. 
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Note: LIC = Low income country (995 US$ or less 2009 GNI per capita), LMIC = Lower middle income 
country (996-3945 US$), UMIC = Upper middle income country (3946-12195 US$), according to the World 
Bank definition. Annual averages (2002-2008) of disbursed AfT receipts (US$ million in constant 2008 prices). 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD (2010). 
 
Aid for trade policy (represented by the AfT category Trade Policies and Regulations) is 
foreign assistance to developing countries over  the whole range of laws, institutions and 
measures  associated with  tariff, non-tariff and regulatory barriers to trade.  Within  this 
framework, it comprises the planning of trade policy in developing countries, the training of 
trade officials, the negotiation of regional, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, the 
analysis of proposals in such  negotiations and their impact on national stakeholders, the 
implementation of trade agreements and compliance with the rules and standards stipulated 
therein, and the facilitation of trade across customs borders. The emphasis is on the reduction 
of non-tariff border barriers to trade, such as customs-related transaction costs or trade costs, 
and the alleviation of behind-the-border trade barriers which are typically of a regulatory 
nature. Both sorts of barriers can in principle be tackled through complementary policies of 
the kind previously specified. 
A major function of AfT in this context is to bridge the compliance and commitment gaps 
facing  developing countries at the multilateral and bilateral trade policy  levels.  Such 
inconsistencies  arose on a sizeable  scale  in the wake of  the multilateral Uruguay Round 
conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the WTO’s predecessor.  In  the Uruguay Round, developing countries 
assumed wide-ranging policy obligations in goods, services and intellectual property which 
they were largely unable to fulfill on their own (compliance  gap). At the same time, the 
commitments by developed countries to assist developing countries in the implementation of 
these policies were often couched in terms of “best endeavor” in the respective agreements, 
i.e. non-binding declarations of intent, leading to a commitment gap. It was this contradiction   8 
which ultimately gave rise to new aid schemes in the form of Trade-Related Technical 
Assistance (TRTA) and Trade-Related Capacity-Building (TRCB) on which the AfT initiative 
builds. 
Similar problems occur in the area of bilateral trade policies where Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) between developing and developed countries now predominate. Such “North-South” 
trade agreements increasingly contain elements of “deep integration”.  Deep integration 
essentially involves action by governments to reduce the market segmenting effect of 
differences in national regulatory regimes through coordination, harmonization or mutual 
recognition of national policies (Koopmann and Vogel 2008). Accordingly, the FTA partner 
countries agree on complementary “behind-the-border” policies in areas like health, safety 
and technical standards, services, intellectual property, government procurement, foreign 
direct investment, competition, taxation, environment and labor, in order to avoid distortions 
to international competition. However, the implementation of such policies is often costly and 
complicated.  They typically involve major institutional changes in the developing partner 
countries, are technically and administratively difficult and therefore demand considerable 
resources. Consequently, a substantial measure of AfT is called for in the context of North-
South FTAs as well. 
The same holds for the unilateral or autonomous level of trade policy. In this case, AfT can 
provide guidance, for instance, on how to “mainstream” trade policy into overall development 
planning. More practically, it may also be needed to secure a better coordination among the 
various government agencies engaged in trade-related policy making. 
Our second core area, aid for trade development, is external support to the build-up of human, 
institutional and physical capacity in developing countries for two major purposes: 
1.  To expand the quantity, increase the diversity and raise the quality of goods and services 
for export markets. 
2.  To secure the delivery of and absorptive capacity for imports of high-quality goods and 
services enhancing the performance of domestic industries. 
AfT in this area therefore seeks to remove both supply- and demand-side constraints to trade 
development. This involves the development of better knowledge about foreign markets; the 
provision of export finance  on reasonable terms;  the  improvement of  trade-related 
infrastructure  (roads, ports,  communications  systems,  etc.)  linking  domestic and foreign 
products to their respective markets; and the creation of superior productive capacity - from 
improved testing laboratories to better supply chains - in specific sectors.7
                                                 
7 An example is the Standards and Trade Development Facility created at the multilateral level – with the WTO 
as lead agency – to assist developing countries with the implementation of international sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards. Such regulations are a major market access barrier for agricultural products of 
developing countries.  
 Widening such   9 
bottlenecks often requires physical investments as well as regulatory reform, which is most 
obvious in the area of infrastructure. For trade-related infrastructure, it is also important to 
address questions of policy consistency across countries, and to prioritize cross-border 
linkages (Estevadeordal et al. 2008).  
Like aid for trade development, aid for adjustment to trade has an internal, import-related and 
an external dimension with a focus on export markets. Internal adjustment costs mainly result 
from closures of production facilities, employment losses and losses of fiscal/tariff revenue in 
the wake of import  liberalization.  Accordingly,  adjustment requirements concern the 
restructuring of production, retraining of labor and fiscal reform while limited adjustment 
capacities may warrant adjustment support from the domestic state or from abroad, in order to 
protect the most vulnerable and facilitate the transition of enterprise and labor to expanding 
sectors of the economy.  In actual fact, adjustment programs addressing  trade-related 
disruptions to local industries and labor markets in developing countries appear to be rather 
sparse. In a number of countries, for instance in Latin America, such disruptions also have 
questioned  voter  support for trade liberalization  and thus  given rise  to a certain “reform 
fatigue” and a heightened risk of backlash to further reform (Estevadeordal et al. 2008). 
External adjustment costs primarily arise from  “preference erosion”  facing developing 
countries on foreign markets as a result of multilateral, bilateral and unilateral trade 
liberalization. Ongoing multilateral liberalization on a most-favored nation (MFN) basis 
effectively undermines the unilateral trade privileges granted to developing countries by 
developed countries under trade regimes such as the various Generalized Systems of 
Preferences. At the same time, bilateral trade liberalization in the frame of North-South FTAs, 
while on the one hand creating new preferences of their own for the partner countries (and 
“vested interests” against their erosion through MFN liberalization), on the other hand often 
diminish the value of unilateral preferences for non-partner countries. This is in particular true 
for LDCs which rarely participate in such agreements. Finally, unilateral trade liberalization 
in foreign countries, e.g. through the removal of fixed-  or guaranteed-price regimes in 
agriculture, can also erode  preferential treatment of trading partners  from  developing 
countries. 
In all three scenarios, compensatory AfT is requested. An  example  is  the island state of 
Mauritius which has been highly dependent on unilateral trade preferences in the textile, 
clothing and sugar industries. As these prerogatives have come under fire from various sides 
(e.g. through the European Union’s  (EU)  new sugar trading regime),  the  government of 
Mauritius has asked for “significant international assistance” in its country’s transition to an 
“open and competitive economy”  which  no longer relies  on “special and differential 
treatment”  from its trading partners. AfT  is considered to form a  “key mechanism”  in   10 
financing the compensatory measures proposed in the frame of a ten-year economic reform 
program to put the economy back onto a long-term growth path (WTO 2008).  
The case for AfT in the adjustment context primarily rests on distributional or equity as 
against efficiency considerations. With regard to internal adjustment, equity within the 
developing countries is at issue, such as the design and financing of  mechanisms for 
compensating inevitable losers in the transition process and boosting the opportunities of 
potential winners. External adjustment, on the other hand, also involves distributional issues 
between countries. Here, the rationale of AfT is to defend the income position of developing 
countries in global competition and to prevent their terms-of-trade from deteriorating. This 




3   Stakeholders in Aid for Trade, their interests and strategies 
3.1  Governments and the World Trade Organization 
Among the many providers of AfT, individual countries and their respective governments 
retain a crucial role in the AfT initiative. Bilateral donors accounted for almost 65 percent of 
total AfT in 2008 (OECD 2010). Increasingly, AfT is also being provided by developing 
countries themselves –  Argentina, Brazil, Chile and China, for instance, all contribute to 
South-South regional integration initiatives,  passing on their own experiences with trade 
liberalization (OECD and WTO 2009). To a growing extent, individual countries like Chile 
and Malaysia are both donors and recipients in AfT.8
 
 Another case is Croatia which has been 
providing development assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina and plans further engagement in 
south eastern Europe (WTO 2010c). However, the bulk of AfT funding is still shouldered by 
the traditional donors like Japan, the United States, the European Commission and EU 







                                                 
8 On the case of Malaysia, see WTO (2009c).   11 































Note: Flows from bilateral donors which are members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee are 
reported. Annual averages (2002-2008) of disbursed AfT flows (US$ million in constant 2008 prices). Source: 
Own calculations based on OECD (2010). 
 
For the top AfT recipients (see Figure 4), of which many are to be found in Asia, AfT appears 
to be a priority in overall aid to development.  In Vietnam and Tanzania, more than 60 percent 
of total (sector-allocable) ODA is allotted to AfT, while Pakistan and Indonesia assign around 
half of the sector aid they receive to AfT (OECD 2010). The fact that these countries perceive 
AfT as most important presumably also contributes to the level of AfT they receive.  
 






























Note: Excluding Iraq and Afghanistan which received huge amounts of post-war aid and are thus statistical 
outliers. Annual averages (2002-2008) of disbursed AfT receipts (US$ million in constant 2008 prices). Source: 
Own calculations based on OECD (2010). 
 
Making Aid for Trade a top priority necessitates the involvement of the donor and partner 
countries’ governments, which is one of the main reasons why domestic interests play an   12 
important role in AfT. Trade ought to be mainstreamed into donors’ aid programming as well 
as into recipients’ national development strategies. Mainstreaming is a tool which helps 
alleviate potential adjustment costs and helps developing countries to appropriately sequence 
trade policies and domestic policies according to their specific needs for seizing opportunities 
offered by trade (WTO 2009b).  
Particularly against the backdrop of growing reluctance to trade liberalization, the 
engagement of political leadership in partner countries is critical for the success of AfT. 
Improving developing countries’ ability to take advantage of liberalized trade  requires a 
partnership in which recipient countries take the lead in prioritizing trade-related projects and 
exercise country ownership, one of the main principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness.9
Country-defined AfT is by no means a warrant that trade-related programs will automatically 
be mainstreamed (Cameron and Njinkeu 2008). Recipient countries’ efforts to mainstream 
trade into development are constrained by aid resources which must compete with priority 
sectors such as health or education. Additionally, inter-ministerial co-operation is often 
lacking. This situation is frequently mirrored in donor countries, where finance ministers may 
undervalue trade while development ministries may have insufficient resources at their 
disposal or have a low standing in the Cabinet. At the same time, supporters of the AfT 
initiative, mainly found in trade and commerce ministries, rarely formulate strategies to 
improve competitiveness.  
 Donors in turn support the process through improving coordination at the 
country and regional levels and by enhancing the predictability of aid flows. 
If political leadership in developing countries is weak and trade policies are incoherent, AfT 
effectiveness cannot necessarily rely on country-owned development, but is rather anticipated 
by donors. For instance, the framework of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) is 
provided by the international financial institutions which decide on content and perceived 
quality of submitted PRSPs and thus actually have ownership of the paper (Kamruzzaman 
2009).10
                                                 
9 “Country ownership” refers to the right and the responsibility of partner countries (here, countries receiving 
AfT) to exercise “effective leadership” over development policies and action in their countries (Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness 2005). 
  A recent survey, commissioned by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) (Kosack 2008), on the role of trade policy in PRSPs, covering 72 PRSPs completed 
by 54 countries between 2000 and early 2008, points to the increasing role that trade is 
playing in poverty reduction strategies. The majority of PRSPs contains a section on trade 
policies and on how to tailor these policies to domestic characteristics. However, the trade-
poverty nexus does not seem to be fully  understood. In reality, many PRSPs deal very 
10 PRSPs are the centerpiece of a new approach to international development co-operation, with a focus on 
poverty reduction, developed by the IMF, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee and the World Bank 
(WTO 2006).   13 
narrowly with trade and do not directly correlate trade and poverty. This might reflect a lack 
of understanding or skepticism of broader-based trade strategies (Kosack 2008).  
Self-assessments  by  partner countries nevertheless  suggest  that they do have a national 
development strategy and in  most  cases  actually mainstream trade –  i.e., make it a key 
priority.  Their AfT priorities coincide with those of donors: Network infrastructure, 
competitiveness, export diversification and trade policy analysis, negotiation and 
implementation (OECD and WTO 2009). Partner countries seem to be increasingly aware that 
trade can play a positive role in promoting economic development (OECD and WTO 2009). 
However, the existence of a national development strategy on paper does not necessarily 
reflect a country’s real engagement in Aid for Trade in terms of effectively implementing and 
operationalizing trade strategies and national and regional dialogues. The success of AfT 
ultimately depends on recipient countries’ ability to put in place the preconditions for 
economic development, i.e. the right legislation, policies, institutions and infrastructure.  
Enhancing  such  capacities in recipient countries is of  major interest to  multilateral 
stakeholders in Aid for Trade, among which the WTO stands out. It is the “nerve centre” of 
AfT where all actions come together. It serves as a platform for the actions of a large number 
of actors (international organizations, regional development banks, donors, civil society) in 
AfT (WTO 2010a). This is in spite of the fact that the WTO is neither a development agency 
nor a financing agency. Rather, its responsibility is the functioning of the multilateral trading 
system. This involves the liberalization of international trade, rule-making to guide member 
countries’ trade policy, dispute settlement among members and surveillance of their concrete 
trade policy conduct. However, the WTO also has a clear interest  that  growing trading 
opportunities  in the course of liberalization are  actually  used  and related adjustment 
requirements  effectively met, in particular with regard to its weaker member countries. 
Moreover,  the WTO is interested to ensure  the needed political backing for global trade 
liberalization to which AfT can be instrumental. 
In fact, the WTO’s direct financial involvement in the AfT initiative is very limited. Its role in 
AfT  is  better described as that of an advocate, facilitator and  supervisor.  This involves 
activities within the WTO as well as joint action with other stakeholders. 
Inside the WTO, three institutions  or  programs are most pertinent to AfT: Special and 
Differential Treatment, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism  and  Trade Facilitation.  AfT 
effectively forms part of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) which the WTO accords to 
developing countries.  At the same time, it represents a new, proactive SDT approach. 
According to traditional SDT, developing countries and in particular LDCs enjoy privileges in 
the multilateral trading system regarding the protection of their domestic markets (“infant 
industry” protection), their access to foreign markets (trade preferences granted by developed 
countries) and the negotiating process itself (non-reciprocity). However, the downside of this   14 
preferential status has been a relatively passive role and isolated position of these countries in 
multilateral negotiations.  
AfT offers a way to change this. It can help developing countries to assume multilateral 
obligations and enhance their bargaining strength and also  assist  them  in building 
international competitiveness and master structural adjustment. In this context, it has been 
proposed  to  grant  poor  countries  a statutory entitlement to technical support for the 
commitments they enter into (WTO 2004). In a similar way, adjustment assistance to trade 
could be institutionalized  in the WTO, e.g. in the form of a multilateral adjustment 
mechanism for poor countries harmed by the freeing of trade.11
Within the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), through which the WTO conducts 
regular surveillance of its members’ trade and trade-related policies, AfT is now a standard 
feature of the WTO Secretariat’s TPR reports for individual member countries. It is no longer 
the sporadic element of the TPRM, confined to trade-related technical assistance  and a 
handful of LDCs, which it was in the past.
 Such measures might help to 
avoid permanent “opt-outs” from multilateral commitments. In sum, AfT has the potential to 
fundamentally transform SDT and ultimately render “positive discrimination” of developing 
countries in the multilateral trading system superfluous. 
12
The full integration of AfT into the TPRM can help to increase the effectiveness of this long-
standing WTO institution aimed at “achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, 
the trade policies and practices of Members” (WTO 1994). In particular, TPRs could pass 
informed judgment on how the different strands of AfT together influence economic and 
social development. In this way, the TPRM could also foster the dialogue between trade, 
finance and development officials and show how to improve existing AfT strategies.  
 In principle, the whole AfT agenda and all 
recipient countries come under scrutiny in current TPRs. Moreover, the AfT performance of 
individual donor countries (including developing countries) is assessed as well. 
The third internal WTO mechanism with a strong bearing on AfT – Trade Facilitation (TF) – 
represents  the only one of the four “Singapore  issues” which has survived  in the Doha 
Round.13
                                                 
11 See, for instance, Riley (2006) who suggests the creation of a new council in the WTO, called the Council for 
Global Trade Adjustment Assistance, through which “transfers … to the least-advantaged workers in less-
developed nations” would be channeled.  
  Core objectives of TF are  to improve the international trade infrastructure, to 
simplify and internationally harmonize customs procedures, and to enhance co-operation 
between customs authorities and other government offices such as certifying or licensing 
12 Trade-related technical assistance for LDCs has been reviewed under the TPRM since the year 2000. In fact, 
the WTO Secretariat’s report on Tanzania (January 2000) was the first TPR report on an LDC containing a 
separate section dedicated to ‚trade-related assistance’. 
13 Besides TF, the “Singapore issues” comprise competition policy, policies towards foreign direct investment 
and transparency in government procurement. At the insistence of developing countries, these policy areas were 
not placed on the Doha Development Agenda.    15 
bodies. The overriding aim is to reduce transaction costs in international trade or trade costs 
associated with logistics, administration and regulation. Such costs often exceed trade costs 
associated with tariffs (Taylor and Wilson 2009).  
TF is genuine AfT in that it not only defines new trading rules but also involves the provision 
of resources to assist developing countries in meeting the new obligations they are expected to 
incur in a WTO trade facilitation agreement. TF therefore is a response to the compliance and 
commitment gaps facing developing countries noted in the preceding section. At the same 
time, AfT is needed for developing countries to effectively participate in the multilateral 
negotiations on TF itself.  
Finally, the co-operative or external role of the WTO in AfT is epitomized in the Enhanced 
Integrated Framework (EIF) which is a strategic partnership between the WTO and five other 
Inter-Governmental Organizations  (International Monetary  Fund (IMF), World Bank, 
UNCTAD, UNDP and ITC) in trade-related assistance to LDCs. The EIF, which became fully 
operational in July 2009, is a mechanism for the  “mainstreaming”  of  trade into national 
development plans. Its prime instrument is Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies carried out in 
the context of a country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.14
 
 At “trade integration strategy 
workshops” stakeholders in AfT are supposed to discuss the findings and recommendations of 
the studies, and donors to indicate their role in financing the needs identified. In this way, 
diagnostic work is expected to translate into funded projects,  and  “mainstreaming”  to 
materialize. 
3.2  The private sector  
The private sector, in particular in the form of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), is 
an engine of trade and growth in many developing countries as it largely contributes to 
economic development in terms of value-added and employment.
15
                                                 
14 Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies essentially represent an “action matrix” to evaluate constraints on a 
country’s integration into the world economy and identify areas where technical assistance and trade programs 
can help the country overcome these barriers (Finger 2008). 
 However, SMEs often 
lack technological capacity and are too small and inadequately endowed with capital to 
compete on dynamic international markets: SMEs’ business entry, survival and expansion are 
challenged by the financial, bureaucratic and managerial obstacles imposed on them in many 
developing countries. As a result, the informal sector in Africa accounts for over 75 percent of 
the total non-agricultural employment on average, compared to 57 and 45 percent in Latin 
America and Asia, respectively (Brewster and Njinkeu 2008).  
15 The WBCSD (2007) asserts that in developing countries, over 90 percent of all non-agrarian firms are SMEs 
and microenterprises.   16 
Entrepreneurship itself relies on the actions taken by developing countries’ governments to 
improve the policy framework and trading environment for individual firms and business 
associations. This includes a functional infrastructure, access to finance, security in terms of 
absence of corruption and crime, and the reduction of regulatory hurdles, including those on 
international markets.16
A precondition for private sector development is recipient country ownership, as promoted by 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and asserted by the International Trade 
Center (ITC), a Geneva-based joint agency of the WTO and the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  which mainly provides trade-related assistance 
concerning the private sector. Under the aegis of country ownership, national institutions and 
governments’ policies are sought after to create an enabling environment.  
 Mambula (2002) surveys 32 small businesses in Nigeria and finds out 
that  SMEs perceive  lack of financing and poor infrastructure as the main growth and 
performance constraints.  
Although aid critics claim that too much aid supporting the public sector rather than the 
private sector might inflate the public sector, crowding out private investment, aid going to 
the public sector finances the provision of public goods such as physical and human capital 
infrastructure which would otherwise be nonexistent in the poorest countries. This may crowd 
in private investment (Morrissey 2006). AfT’s country-centric approach helps to focus aid on 
private sector development,  with responsible recipient countries being  ‘intermediaries’ 
representing their private sector’s interests toward developed country donors. AfT initiatives 
should target the SME business community indirectly by creating a trade enabling 
environment through setting the legal framework (securing property rights, enforcement of 
contracts and eliminating red tape), for instance. At the same time, bottom-up approaches to 
cluster-building and enhancing networking among SMEs can be a valuable component for 
microeconomic development. Small-scale enterprise clusters foster interest representation, 
cost-saving production and mutual know-how (UNIDO 2001).17  Similarly, business 
membership associations strengthen collective action and can act as trade promotion 
motors.18 AfT can also improve business collaborations by helping local suppliers approach 
big companies and by facilitating the set-up of business linkages, particularly when SMEs are 
neither aware of such possibilities nor capable to do so on their own (Aggarwal and Huelin 
2009).19
                                                 
16 See Dethier et al. (2008). These authors also review respective studies, finding that the named elements of the 
investment climate significantly impact firm performance. 
  
17 See Hoekman and Wilson (2010) for examples on private sector initiatives. 
18 See Agboghoroma et al. (2009) for further details on the role of business membership organizations. 
19 Multinational and large local manufacturers are often hesitant to work with small local suppliers due to 
reliability concerns and quality requirements, although there are benefits in delivery time and transport costs, 
among others. The objective is to overcome these concerns and establish integrative local networks (UNIDO 
2001).   17 
In addition to these business-to-business linkages, a proactive approach to direct collaboration 
between business and governments is needed. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) and 
corporate social responsibility programs may contribute to economic growth. Aid for Trade 
can act as a facilitator for these processes, helping to match demand for AfT intervention with 
the corresponding aid flows (Aggarwal and Huelin 2009). PPPs are increasingly becoming 
important for the biggest AfT category, infrastructure. Private sector participation in planning, 
financing and implementing infrastructure projects in developing countries may deliver better 
results due to improvements in efficiency and the quality of service (Harris 2003).  
However, both public and private actors in developing countries are often doubtful about the 
true intentions of the other. If expectations and policies do not match, disappointing results 
concerning prices, services and performance are to be expected (Harris 2003). Particularly the 
political economy of pricing seems to be a key challenge. Public pricing has often been below 
economic costs of infrastructure projects, as infrastructure services are considered to be an 
essential public good. Inevitably, prices rise with private sector involvement, yet governments 
cannot expect the private sector to bridge the gap between applied and real costs (Harris 
2003).  
Although public policy approaches to direct private sector development seem to be 
demanding, individual cases show that  countries with a high level of communication, 
exchange and collaboration between the government, the private sector and civil society are 
more likely to implement reliable and feasible reforms  and to successfully manage to 
participate in the international trading system (OECD and WTO 2009, Aggarwal and Huelin 
2009).  Such public-private stakeholder dialogues, however,  appear to take place more 
frequently in higher-income partner countries, while in terms of geography, they are found to 
be most common in Latin America (OECD and WTO 2009). The situation in those countries 
where co-operation with the private sector is weak or non-existent is worrying as enhancing 
trade development is directly contingent on entrepreneurship, i.e. on expanding production 
and raising the quality of goods and services, in order to export more to world markets at 
competitive prices. Furthermore, involving the private sector in planning and implementing 
development schemes builds trust and commitment in the business community and avoids a 
situation of them and us (Oboko 2008). It also does justice to the fact that the private sector is 
not only a potential beneficiary of AfT, but also a financial supporter. Firms (in the formal 
sector) in principle contribute indirectly through taxes on business revenue. 
To  provide  the private sector with financial resources, some development and financing 
institutions have put in place private sector programs themselves. These include the World 
Bank with its programs for the private sector, covering areas such as the investment climate, 
public-private partnerships and work on support for SMEs; the Inter-American Development 
Bank, providing long-term loans and guarantees for private enterprises; the African   18 
Development Bank which has a private sector development strategy to integrate private sector 
concerns in the bank’s operations as well as its own private sector department dealing with 
private sector lending; the Asian Development Bank, extending lines of credit to public and 
private financial intermediaries of its developing members, which mainly benefit productive 
private SMEs; and bilateral donors with their private sector programs, such as the UK’s 
Department for International Development, the US Agency for International Development 
and the Swedish International Development Agency, amongst others (Brewster and Njinkeu 
2008).  European aid donors with interest in the private sector have established so-called 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) which operate almost exclusively in developing 
countries and countries with transition economies. DFIs are mandated by their respective 
governments to provide long-term financing to the private sector, with specific value-added 
development objectives, but on a sustainable commercial basis (Rodríguez and Santiso 2007). 
These and other private banks are actively involved in developing countries, with Asia and 
Latin America being the biggest recipients of bank flows to emerging economies, while 
Africa is last (Rodríguez and Santiso 2007). 
Furthermore, governments in developing countries themselves have implemented measures to 
mitigate the impact of the financial crisis, such as supporting trade-related lending through 
government-owned export credit agencies or by implementing broader measures that promote 
the competitiveness of the domestic and export oriented sectors (Malouche 2009).20
Apart from donor and recipient countries’ governments, particularly regional and sub-regional 
development banks (RDBs and SRDBs) play an important role in acting as “market makers” 
for financial innovation in developing countries (Griffith-Jones et al. 2008). Griffith-Jones et 
al. (2008) find that there is a need for the creation of new SRDBs to cover financing gaps 
particularly in Asia, where the Asian Development Bank seems to be the only major and 
effective regional bank, while in the case of Latin America, an existing network of SRDBs 
exists with banks effectively granting credits to countries in the region. The existence of these 
big lenders seems to be relevant for financing infrastructure gaps and providing counter-
cyclical finance when private finance is not available.  
  
Another form of credit – trade finance –directly concerns import and export activities. Trade 
finance provides fluidity and security to moving goods and services worldwide by insuring 
against risks such as illiquidity and delayed or failed delivery (Auboin 2007). Around 90 
percent of world trade are said to rely on trade finance. It is widely regarded as “the lifeline of 
international trade” (Auboin 2007), while it may need boosting through trade finance 
facilitation programs, especially in times of crisis. Availability of trade finance has suffered 
from the credit crunch related to the global financial crisis while the price of trade finance, i.e. 
                                                 
20 For a list of government actions taken by 14 selected countries surveyed by the World Bank in 2009, see 
Malouche (2009, Annex 2).    19 
fees for commercial letters of credit and other instruments, rose sharply in 2008 as the crisis 
took hold.  Most notably,  sub-Saharan Africa continues to face severe  constraints.  For 
commercial banks, collecting information on counterparty risk is costly; combined with the 
low productivity of small operations in the region, trade financing therefore continues to be 
unattractive. In response, multilateral development banks, including the World Bank, have 
launched lending programs, in order  to catalyze a “revival”  in trade credit. These trade 
finance facilitation programs are relevant for Aid for Trade in so far as secure finance 
available to the private sector is one of the requirements for business to engage in trade and 
actually benefit from customs reforms and better infrastructure (Auboin 2007).  
The AfT initiative itself appears to have created leverage to increase the availability of trade 
finance for developing countries. In conjunction with the global economic crisis, which has 
depressed trade financing, and in the absence of strong interest opposing, the case for trade 
finance facilitation has gained a high political profile. In consequence, “the policy response 
could only be strong and swift” (Hallaert 2009). Trade finance facilitation programs have 
proven to be effective particularly for small and medium sized producers in developing 
countries. As they require relatively small funding and developing countries have demanded 
for more programs dealing with trade credits, the AfT initiative has provided the framework 
for more donor funding in this area (Auboin 2007).  
 
 
4  Trade liberalization and adjustment to trade reform through Aid for 
Trade 
4.1  Shaping trade liberalization on the domestic and international level  
According to the World Bank (2010), there has been a clear liberalization trend in developing 
countries within the last decades. Average MFN applied tariffs decreased from 30 percent in 
1985 to 10 percent in 2009, while non-tariff barriers also declined. Trade liberalization and 
regulatory reform nevertheless still are far from complete, even in those developing countries 
that have proceeded quickly in these areas in the recent past. Most important in this context 
appear to be domestic, behind-the-border reforms in areas like infrastructure, education, labor 
markets, customs administration and the public sector in general, all of which are genuinely 
AfT-related.  
Particular attention should be paid to AfT concerning trade policy, including ‘trade-related’ 
policies, at both the negotiation and implementation stage, which are often resource-intensive 
and reach “deep into the domestic economy and its institutions” (Sally 2009). We analyze 
these aid flows detached from the disputed aid-trade and aid-growth nexus in the existing 
literature, referring to Busse et al. (2010) who argue that specific trade-related development 
assistance is not necessarily plagued by general aid effectiveness concerns due to its   20 
specificity. In this case, aid channels and motives are less heterogeneous, and generic 
statements on how aid impacts trade may therefore be avoided. However, critics claim that 
liberalizing reforms imposed by donors from above, involving aid dependence and donor 
conditionality particularly in Africa, have performed worse than sustained reforms driven by 
governments in developing countries themselves. AfT would thus merely play a marginal role 
in medium to long-term trade reforms and should not be relied on (Sally 2009).  
Empirical analysis attaches a high degree of effectiveness, in terms of the trade flows created, 
to aid for trade policy (including regulatory reform) as compared to other AfT categories like 
trade development in specific sectors or infrastructure development (Helble et al. 2009). From 
this, it is concluded that relatively small additions to the aid flows directed toward the trade 
policy and regulatory reform agenda could significantly increase the trade of recipient 
countries and thereby also stimulate economic growth (Helble et al. 2009). The importance of 
the relatively minor category Trade Policies and Regulations  is also highlighted in the 
OECD’s and WTO’s joint “Aid for Trade at a Glance 2009” report according to which AfT is 
most effective in the areas of “trade policy analysis” and “trade facilitation, negotiation and 
implementation”, ahead of “competitiveness”, “export diversification” and “regional 
integration” (OECD and WTO 2009)..Aid for Trade Policies and Regulations is furthermore 
an important factor in reducing trade costs. For instance, Busse et al. (2010) find that an 
increase by one standard deviation (26.3 million US$) of accumulated aid to Trade Policies 
and Regulations is associated with an import cost reduction by almost 85 US$ – per 20-foot-
container imported. This corresponds to a reduction of import cost by 5 percent. As noted in 
OECD  and  WTO  (2009),  findings  on the effectiveness of aid to Trade Policies and 
Regulations  are confirmed by specific studies, e.g.  concerning technical support for 
implementing SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary) measures. Naturally, programs to build SPS 
capacity are especially important for countries where agriculture remains an essential 
economic activity and a major source of foreign exchange earnings, i.e. the vast majority of 
developing countries.  AfT may pave the way for successful trade liberalization through 
effective aid for trade-related policies, and ultimately through its politico-economic function, 
to which we turn now.  
A  major aspect  of trade  liberalization  in developing countries  is its impact  on  income 
distribution or equity, and the role of AfT in this context. Insofar as a conflict or trade-off 
exists between trade and distribution, a similar tension is inherent to AfT itself: Through the 
promotion of trade, AfT may give rise to adverse distributional effects, which at the same 
time are supposed to be remedied through assisting in complementary policies forming the 
critical element in translating trade-driven economic growth into the achievement of 
distributional goals and in particular of poverty reduction.    21 
The political economy context determines to which extent different interest groups within a 
country benefit from trade liberalization. Formal and informal institutions, for example, shape 
trade (policies) and growth, which in turn determine the degree of actors’ integration into and 
participation in them.21
An example of how this may be achieved is the European Union. Members are obliged to 
open up by accepting the principles of the common market, while at the same time cohesion 
policy helps poorer countries converge to the income levels of richer member states. Trade 
liberalization is accompanied by financial assistance, which is supposed to be the decisive 
factor for a positive perception of integration in domestic public opinion.  
 Furthermore, even if trade may create global gains, its redistributive 
effects and induced price variations within a country affecting employees and producers in 
import competing sectors, for example, need to be considered to make trade liberalization 
politically feasible. 
In a similar way, financial assistance to developing countries and assistance for adjustment 
and economic development may increase domestic support for trade liberalization and ensure 
the political viability of trade reforms (Higgins and Prowse 2010). As Sally (2009) affirms, 
today governments themselves are more skeptical and defensive about further liberalization 
due to the loss of privileges resulting from domestic protection, the costs of adjustment and 
restructuring as well as the threat of preference erosion on foreign markets. At the same time, 
interest group opposition is stronger than in previous waves of liberalization.  On the 
‘domestic  political market for protection’, AfT can thus  be seen as a side payment to 
overcome resistance to market opening.  
A strategic approach to strengthen supply side capabilities calls for supporting enterprises and 
producers by investing in business development, enhanced skills to provide qualified 
personnel and technology absorption (UNCTAD 2008). The private sector’s knowledge of 
day-to-day constraints to growth ought to be utilized fully to identify suitable Aft projects and 
to ensure appropriate prioritizing  and sequencing  of  their  implementation. Bottom-up 
approaches within a national or regional framework are needed to strengthen business-to-
government  and  business-to-business linkages, as was highlighted in Section 3.2. In 
particular, the integration of developing countries into international supply chains appears to 
be threatened by growing transaction costs and difficulties of decentralizing increasingly 
complex industrial procedures, preventing these countries to follow an industrialization path 
similar to that taken by China or Mexico and thereby attract foreign direct investment and 
technologies and create manufacturing jobs. AfT could possibly help to prevent this kind of 
“deglobalization” and thus enable developing countries to benefit from global  production 
networks (Escaith 2009). 
                                                 
21 See for instance Rodrik (2001).   22 
In addition, trade reforms ought to be designed in an employment-friendly way, “making the 
reallocation of jobs more conducive to formal employment growth”, as a joint study from the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the WTO claims (Bacchetta et al. 2009). On 
average, around 60 percent of job creation in developing countries has taken place in the 
informal economy, which is characterized by less security, lower incomes and no access to 
social benefits or training programs. The higher the informality, the more vulnerable are 
countries to shocks like the current global crisis. It has been shown that informal employment 
curbs trade benefits and limits the potential to benefit from trade opportunities (Bacchetta et 
al. 2009).  According to Bacchetta  et al. (2009), empirical  studies show that more open 
economies have less informal employment, but that trade reforms may increase informality in 
the short run. Thus, integration into the world economy and lowering informal employment 
through adequate domestic labor market policies should be considered complementary. 
Fundamentally, it is the distributive and redistributive dimensions of trade liberalization that 
must be taken into account to ensure its political viability. Although most empirical studies 
find that trade liberalization generates trade gains from domestically reallocating resources to 
more productive sectors, leading to lower prices of (imported) goods, better technologies and 
higher real incomes in the medium to long term, individuals may be faced with huge costs and 
short-term disadvantages  (Aggio and Tussie 2006). The AfT initiative’s dual approach 
provides for not only supporting (export oriented) producers, but for offering compensation 
schemes for employees and entrepreneurs who had benefited from the previous structure of 
relative prices. Social safety nets are needed to compensate those who lose from trade 
liberalization. The key is to put in place policies and institutions that facilitate structural 
adjustment tailored to each country’s needs, such as labor market reforms to promote inter- 
and intra-sector labor mobility, easing balance-of-payment and exchange rate problems, 
financial market and tax reforms to make up for losses from declining government revenue 
due to cuts in trade taxes, and, as already dealt with, improving business relations and the 
environment for the industries (Fernandez de Cordoba et al. 2006). 
Trade-related  structural adjustment programs funded through AfT might have been quite 
small so far,22 but it is expected that they increase over the medium term due to the economic 
crisis (OECD and WTO 2009). This will evoke further discussions on how far AfT should 
deal with adjustment costs at all.23
                                                 
22 The low amount of AfT spent on trade-related structural adjustment, as reported under the OECD’s CRS, is 
mostly due to the fact that trade-related adjustment was not introduced until 2007 as a separate category. 
 We argue that AfT is both a direct input into trade-policy 
23 As Stiglitz and Charlton (2006) postulate, AfT should not be compensatory in nature, but rather driven by the 
motivation to create effective market access by removing internal barriers to trade. For countries suffering from 
adjustment shocks, funding should be available, since these countries may need to be assured of transition 
support from the international community as a quid pro quo for their consenting to the removal of trade barriers. 
But AfT should be forward oriented by promoting future exports, not compensating the loss of past exports 
(Stiglitz and Charlton 2006).    23 
making and an indirect “facilitator” of trade policy in that it helps to remove political 
resistance against trade reform domestically, not least by funding compensation schemes and 
structural adjustment programs, including appropriate macroeconomic and exchange rate 
policies to adjust to international competition. 
In addition to its role as domestic trade facilitator, Aid for Trade needs to bear the challenges 
at the international and regional levels. The aid scene has experienced a multiplication of 
actors and an unprecedented expansion in the number of donors and their fragmentation in 
recent decades, and the AfT initiative is by no means excluded from this process. The trend is 
reinforced by the growing number of recipient countries that are no longer only aid recipients, 
but also aid donors (South-south co-operation). Apart from bilateral and  multilateral 
development actors, the emergence of other governance forms contributes to the growing 
complexity of the development finance system. For instance, the number of regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) has increased manifold, putting the regional dimension into the focus of 
trade and development. Regional development banks, research networks, NGOs or common 
policies all can be considered institutionalized regional governance forms. The pan-African 
initiative NEPAD24 is one example of this new multidimensional form of region-to-region 
integration (de Lombaerde and Mavrotas 2009). Although many developing countries 
perceive potential benefits of regional integration – trade within the same geographical area 
can indeed better promote diversification and structural change than overall trade (UNCTAD 
2007) –, institutions and policies at regional level are still country-led and rather weak. Policy 
competences are diffused across levels and among actors. Regional institutions’ absorptive 
capacities of aid can be considered low in many cases due to a non-existent or thin budget, the 
lack of ownership and institutional weaknesses of regional bodies implying a low quality of 
regional policies (de Lombaerde and Mavrotas 2009). For instance, African regional 
integration is characterized by a multitude of arrangements and overlapping membership in 
the same region,25
                                                 
24 The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was established in 2001 and “focuses on the 
provision of essential regional public goods (such as transport, energy, water, information and communication 
technology, disease eradication, environmental preservation and provision of regional research capacity), as well 
as the promotion of intra-African trade and investments.” (UNCTAD 2009). 
 leading to confusing differences in degrees of integration, institutional 
goals and unnecessary competition between countries (UNCTAD 2009).  Although intra-
regional trade has increased in many regions, regional trade agreements in themselves do not 
automatically increase regional trade, as there are other factors such as the demand and supply 
structures in participating countries that impact trade performance (UNCTAD 2007). Yang 
and Gupta (2005) find that African countries cannot exploit the potential benefits of RTAs 
(such as synergies and economies of scale) due to small market size, poor transport facilities 
25 Many African countries hold multiple memberships. Of the 53 countries, 27 are members of two regional 
groupings, 18 belong to three, and one country is a member of four. Only seven countries have maintained 
membership in one bloc (UNCTAD 2009).    24 
and high trading costs. While RTAs mostly aim at reducing trade barriers among members, 
relatively high barriers against trade with the rest of the world “have essentially turned RTAs 
into an import substitution policy at the regional and subregional level” (Yang and Gupta 
2005). Also, it is held that bilateral and regional agreements have proved to be “trade light” in 
many cases, with little impact in the way of tackling domestic regulatory trade barriers, e.g. 
relating to investment, competition, government procurement, trade facilitation, services, 
cross-border labor movement, labor-market rigidities in general, and food-safety and technical 
standards (Sally and Alves 2009).  
AfT needs to respond to these developments by strengthening the regional dimension, i.e. 
promoting links between countries (such as trade coalitions, co-operation on AfT issues, 
RTAs) and between regions within countries. The latter offers vast opportunities for better 
donor coordination and the exploitation of synergies.26
Concerning bilateral and regional trade liberalization, the EU offers some valuable insights, 
being  one of the main AfT  providers  and having considerable experience with regional 
arrangements like the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), trade agreements 
which  help the ACP countries integrate into the world economy.  The  EU attempts to 
coordinate the work of national and regional institutions in the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group (ACP) of countries, and EU AfT does indeed often go beyond the national dimension, 
covering the regional level of intervention. However, private sector support is often provided 
horizontally across sectors of activity, without differentiating between import-competing or 
export industry (Bilal and Rampa 2009). Particularly in the EU-ACP case, the complex and 
multi-level institutional co-operation pattern that has been built up reduces policy coherence 
  Trade support activities are 
conceptualized rather vaguely and often not prioritized; available resources are spread over 
many different programs  and countries  (Brewster and Njinkeu 2008). Concerning links 
between countries, many AfT topics cannot be confined to national borders, but require a 
border-crossing institutional or organizational setting. The regulatory support function of AfT 
is particularly relevant in this context. Regional aid for trade concentrates on infrastructure 
and on trade negotiations capacity building (OECD and WTO 2009). Examples include 
border-crossing infrastructure and transport routes particularly for landlocked countries, trade 
facilitation measures to appropriately advance closer regional co-operation, regional trade 
development programs to enable more enterprises to compete on international markets and 
guidance on how to effectively negotiate bilateral and regional trade agreements. In sum, 80 
percent of bilateral and multilateral donors evaluate the regional dimension –  concerning 
regional integration and South-south trade – as an essential element of their AfT strategies 
(OECD and WTO 2009).  
                                                 
26 Generally, regionalization requires more coordination among donors and among aid. Regional arrangements 
seem to be more flexible if positively evaluated, or unstable if negatively viewed, than national institutions (de 
Lombaerde and Mavrotas 2009).     25 
and aid effectiveness  (de Lombaerde and Mavrotas 2009).  Besides, progress in the EPA 
negotiations is slow. The enormous trust gap in the negotiations is one possible explanation. 
ACP countries’ governments fear that they might not be able to deal with the economic and 
societal consequences induced by the comprehensive EPAs and that the EU might not meet 
their pledges on financial and technical assistance in the future (Busse 2010). Furthermore, 
the degree of ownership in EU development projects is rather low, reflecting the situation in 
development co-operation in general (Bilal and Rampa 2009).  Particularly in bilateral 
settings, country  ownership has a decisive political economy facet in so far as donors’ 
assistance to trade negotiating strategies and export promotion programs might contradict 
their own economic interests.  Through its promotion of trade, AfT differs from other 
development policies and has a stake in strategic trade policy concerns.  
 
4.2  Coping with the consequences of multilateral trade liberalization: the case of 
preference erosion 
As noted in Section 2.2, developing countries face two major kinds of challenges with regard 
to the consequences of trade liberalization: 
1.  To manage the structural adjustment requirements arising from intensified import 
competition on domestic markets and the shortfall of tariff revenues in the wake of own or 
internal liberalization. These issues were discussed inter alia in the preceding section. 
2.  To cope with the erosion of trade preferences on export markets, which were unilaterally 
granted to developing countries, as a result of foreign or external liberalization. This is the 
subject of the present section. 
Among the three channels of preference erosion described in Section 2.2, i.e. multilateral, 
bilateral and unilateral external liberalization, the multilateral is the most important one. De 
jure liberalization of developed-country markets through multilateral negotiations following 
the MFN principle may de facto entail de-liberalization for those developing countries which 
lose part or all of their preferential status on these markets in the process. From a political 
economic viewpoint, it is critical that in this case, in contrast to the bilateral and unilateral 
constellations, the affected developing countries are themselves parties to the negotiations. 
Accordingly, they have an incentive to oppose MFN tariff reductions in sectors of particular 
export interest to them, for fear of losing their preference margins, i.e. the difference between 
applied MFN and preferential duty rates. Against this backdrop, AfT could help to “buy out” 
(Bhagwati 2005) the developing countries’ resistance to liberalization or form a means of 
“buying progress in the negotiations” (Charlton and Stiglitz 2006).  It  would  thereby 
contribute to the provision of a global public good, as represented in a non-discriminatory 
world trade regime (Hoekman and Prowse 2009). Concern about the erosion of nonreciprocal 
trade preferences is indeed reflected in the negotiating positions of many developing countries   26 
in the Doha Round and in the corresponding negotiating texts, making preference erosion a 
key point of debate in the Doha Development Agenda.27
The most prominent beneficiaries of unilateral and nonreciprocal trade preferences are LDCs. 




Among the preference-giving trading partners, the EU stands out. The average margin of 
preference on merchandise imports from developing countries into the EU has been calculated 
at 3.8 percent compared to between 0.5 and 0.7 percent on imports into other developed 
countries.
 In sector terms, the incidence of trade preferences is highest in agriculture and – 
within the manufacturing sector – in clothing and textiles.  
29 Altogether, the EU accounts for nearly 50 percent of the preference value for 
LDCs and more than 40 percent of the value for other developing countries (Hoekman et al. 
2009).30
It follows that LDCs are  the  most  vulnerable  countries  to preference erosion through 
multilateral trade liberalization. The potential impact of preference erosion on these countries 
has even grown in recent times as preference schemes for LDCs now typically entail duty- 
and quota-free market access rather than merely granting a preference. It  is  therefore  no 
longer possible to align the preferential tariff with the new MFN tariff and thus effectively 
preserve the existing preference margin.  
  
At the same time, the risk of preference erosion and related export and income losses is 
concentrated to a high degree on a limited number of goods and countries. Especially, this is 
true for agriculture. Examples include bananas (Belize, Cameroon, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Swaziland), sugar (Barbados, Belize, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland) and beverages and spirits (Barbados, Belize, 
Jamaica). In each case, most of the impact is likely to originate in the EU market (Low et al. 
2009b).  
However, the actual economic impact of preference erosion is to some extent limited by a 
reduced effectiveness of the preference schemes themselves which often shows up in a less 
than full utilization of the preferences granted owing to the costs  and complexities of 
                                                 
27 For details, see Low et al. (2009a and 2009b) and Hoekman et al. (2009b). 
28 See Candau and Jean (2009) and Dean and Wainio (2009) for detailed evidence on the significance of EU 
and US trade preference schemes, respectively, for beneficiary countries. Van der Mensbrugghe (2009) finds that 
on the whole trade preferences boost export revenue in the lowest-income countries by 2.3 percent while 
increasing their net income by 0.3 percent. 
29 For the calculation, the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) database, version 6, has been used which 
contains a default set of trade barriers incorporating preferences, as well as an alternative set with trade-barrier 
estimates in the absence of preferences (i.e. estimated MFN rates). For details, see van der Mensbrugghe (2009). 
30 “Preference value” means the preference margin multiplied by the corresponding trade flows. It represents an 
upper bound of the actual preference value as it is assumed that the preferences granted are fully used and no 
cost of compliance with regulatory requirements such as rules of origin arise.   27 
complying with entry requirements such as rules of origin. Furthermore, factors outside the 
preference systems frequently affect their effectiveness. This in particular holds for domestic 
supply constraints in developing countries. A case in point is the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) under which since 2000 duty-free access to the US market has been 
granted to about 40 African countries, including access in the highly contentious area of 
garments and textiles. However, petroleum products still account for the vast majority of these 
countries’ exports to the United States while the diversification of exports that AGOA was 
supposed to spur has not materialized. The main reason for this seem to be infrastructure and 
other supply-side problems such as an expensive and intermittent power supply, weak 
transport systems and corruption (Beattie 2010). 
The  remedies  proposed  for preference erosion  include  trade and non-trade solutions.31
While trade solutions thus offer little in the way of tackling the preference-erosion problem, 
non-trade or aid-based devices could be more effective. In particular, this applies to AfT. AfT 
can assist the beneficiary countries of trade preferences in restructuring the production base 
towards areas of true comparative advantage where international competitiveness does not 
depend on preferential treatment. Through addressing the internal causes of a country’s poor 
export performance, AfT can also help to cure the ineffectiveness of trade preference schemes 
and to achieve the original objective that motivated preferential access regimes.  
  
Solutions tied to trade or trade policy urge improvements to existing preference schemes, e.g. 
a relaxation of origin rules in order to increase utilization ratios and lower compliance costs, 
as well as the creation of new preferences such as in the services sector and by advanced 
developing countries.  However, proceeding in this direction would essentially  perpetuate 
fundamentally flawed policies distorting economic  incentives  and  violating the 
nondiscrimination principle on which the multilateral trading system builds. The same holds 
for those proposals which advocate avoiding  MFN liberalization in the most preference-
sensitive areas.  
 
 
5   Conclusion 
AfT is both a prerequisite of and a complement to the liberalization of trade, i.e. a means to 
maximize the benefits and minimize the (adjustment) costs from trade liberalization  in a 
globalized trading system. On the one hand, it is concerned with so-called behind-the-border 
regulatory reforms, in services, procurement, labor markets, investment rules, and so on, to 
remedy supply-side constraints to increase developing countries’ exports; on the other hand, it 
must tackle adjustment problems caused by the deregulation of home markets, the pressure of 
                                                 
31 For an overview of policy responses to preference erosion, see Hoekman and Prowse (2009).   28 
higher import volumes after opening up and losses from preference erosion and the like. AfT 
has the potential to promote trade liberalization  and facilitate trade on  the domestic and 
international level, and to master the consequences of trade liberalization. 
This dual approach of AfT – proactive on the one hand, compensatory on the other – has 
gained exceptional relevance in the wake of the global crisis concerning trade openness. AfT 
is interpreted as a potential political economy driver of trade reform processes in developing 
countries. This holds directly, through the Trade Policies and Regulations component of AfT, 
and indirectly through AfT helping to improve the political conditions and thus to pave the 
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